详细信息

基于合同理论的逆向供应链定价策略研究    

Reverse-supply Chain Pricing Strategy Based on Contract Theory

文献类型:期刊文献

中文题名:基于合同理论的逆向供应链定价策略研究

英文题名:Reverse-supply Chain Pricing Strategy Based on Contract Theory

作者:孔令丞[1];骆唐杰[2]

机构:[1]华东理工大学商学院;[2]TNT天地华宇物流集团

年份:2012

卷号:9

期号:4

起止页码:594

中文期刊名:管理学报

外文期刊名:Chinese Journal of Management

收录:CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2011】;CSSCI:【CSSCI2012_2013】;

基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972062);国家社会科学基金资助项目(06BJY034)

语种:中文

中文关键词:逆向物流;再制造;合同;定价

外文关键词:reverse-supply chain; remanufacture; contract ; pricing

摘要:利用合同理论的方法,借鉴类似回购合同的假设,研究"制造商-零售商"二级供应链中3种不同质量水平的产品回收最优定价问题,以最大化零售商、制造商和供应链的利润。该闭环供应链中只有一个制造商和零售商,零售商负责产品的回收。从分析可知,通过调整参数值,在回收率确定或随机的情况下供应链都可以达到协调,也都可以找到最优订货量和回收价格。研究发现,零售商的最优价格与最优订货量紧密相关,制造商的回收价格并不影响供应链的总体利润。
There are three types of recovery mode because of extended producer responsibility, which are producer recovery, outsourcing and joint recovery. Recovery by producers assisted by retailers is a typical, effective outsourcing recovery mode. In this paper, we focus on how to determine the optimal buyback prices of recycled products with different quality in the "manufacturer - retailer" two-level supply chain, in order to allow manufacturers, retailers and supply chain to maximize their profits. To do that, we use the contract theory, draw on a similar assumption of buy-back contracts and assume there are three types of quality degree of reeyclable products in the closed-Loop supply chain, and there is only one manufacturer and a retailer and the retailer has been in charge of recycling products sold. The results show that by adjusting the parameter values, no matter the recovery prob- ability is random or not, circumstances of the supply chain coordination can be achieved. We also can find the optimal order volume and recovery price. And we also see that the optimal retail price is closely related to the optimal order quantity, the manufacturer's optimal price does not affect the overall supply chain profit.

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