文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Multiple learning mechanisms promote cooperation in public goods games with project selection

作者：Zhong, Li-Xin[1,2];Xu, Wen-Juan[3];Chen, Rong-Da[1,2];He, Yun-Xin[1,2];Qiu, Tian[4];Ren, Fei[5];Shi, Yong-Dong[6];Zhong, Chen-Yang[7]

机构：[1]Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Hangzhou 310018, Peoples R China;[2]Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Coordinated Innovat Ctr Wealth Management & Quant, Hangzhou 310018, Peoples R China;[3]Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Law, Hangzhou 310018, Peoples R China;[4]Nanchang Hangkong Univ, Sch Informat Engn, Nanchang 330063, Jiangxi, Peoples R China;[5]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[6]Dongbei Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Appl Finance & Behav Sci, Dalian 116025, Peoples R China;[7]Stanford Univ, Dept Stat, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

年份：2020

卷号：133

外文期刊名：CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS

收录：;EI(收录号：20200508103667);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000520892300032)】；

基金：This work is the research fruits of Humanities and Social Sciences Fund sponsored by Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China (Grant nos. 19YJAZH120, 17YJAZH067, 18YJA790115, 17YJC790149) and National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 71371165, 11865009, 71871094, 71971046, 71471161, 71631005, 71773105, 71471031, 71772030, 71702025), Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. LY17G030024), Major Projects of National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 19ZDA094), the Program of Distinguished Professor in Liaoning Province (Grant No. [2018]35).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Public goods game; Project selection; Multiple learning mechanism; Individual preference

摘要：How evolution favors cooperation is a fundamental issue in social and economic systems. In the business world, actively selecting a suitable project is usually helpful for a businessman to be in an advantageous position. By incorporating project selection mechanism into the threshold public goods game, we have investigated the coupling effect of mutation and imitation in updating one's preferred project scale on the evolution of cooperation. Compared with the situation where there is no project selection mechanism, the existence of project selection may suppress or promote cooperation depending upon different updating rules. There exists a critical ratio of the imitators in the population, below which cooperation is suppressed while above which cooperation is promoted. With the coevolving of individual strategies and preferred project scales, a higher level of cooperation corresponds to a larger average value of the preferred project scales. A theoretical analysis indicates that, as most of the individuals are mutants, the coevolving process is governed by the mutation process, which leads to a smaller average value of the preferred project scales and a lower level of cooperation. As most of the individuals are imitators, the coevolving process is governed by the coupling of the mutation and imitation processes, which leads to a larger average value of the preferred project scales and a higher level of cooperation. As all the individuals are imitators, the coevolving process is governed by the imitation process, which leads to an intermediate average value of the preferred project scales and an intermediate level of cooperation. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.