文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Contract preference for the dominant supplier subject to inventory inaccuracy

作者：Tao, Feng[1];Yu, Hao[1];Fan, Tijun[1];Lai, Kin Keung[2]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Management Sci & Engn, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]Shenzhen Univ, Coll Econ, Shenzhen, Peoples R China

年份：2020

卷号：141

外文期刊名：COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING

收录：;EI(收录号：20200508117527);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000517654200022)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000517654200022)】；

基金：This work was supported in part by the Shanghai Pujiang Program under Grant 18PJCO25; in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 71872064, Grant 71972071, Grant 71431004, Grant 71772063; in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai under Grant 18ZR1409400.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Inventory inaccuracy; Contract preference; Supply chain management; Retail competition

摘要：Inventory inaccuracy is usually inevitable, and affects decision making. This paper investigates the operational decisions and contract preference in a supply chain with one supplier and two competing retailers that are subject to inventory inaccuracy. The supplier, acting as the Stackelberg leader, first decides the contract format and pricing policy. The two retailers are followers, which make their decisions simultaneously. We establish a newsvendor model to derive the equilibrium solutions analytically under the buyback contract, consignment contract and hybrid contract scenarios. Then we conduct a numerical study to illustrate the impact of inventory inaccuracy on the supplier chain members' operational policy and the dominant supplier's contract preference. The results show that inventory inaccuracy plays an important role in determining the retailers' equilibrium order quantities and retail prices, and the supplier's wholesale (consignment) price. In particular, one retailer is better off (worse off) if the other who adopts the consignment (buyback) contract improves the inventory availability. Importantly, inventory inaccuracy affects the supplier's contracting strategy. If the inventory availability changes, then the optimal contract selection may, accordingly, be changed. The conclusions reveal that although inventory inaccuracy is assumed to have occurred on the retailer's side, both the retailer and the supplier are greatly influenced by the inventory inaccuracy. Therefore, the supplier should fully consider inventory availability and retail competition before determining the contract format. The retailer should improve his inventory availability to enhance competitiveness, to receive a more profitable contract format from the supplier.