详细信息
家族企业的“掏空”行为与会计盈余质量
Tunneling and Earnings Quality:Evidence from Family Controlled Listed Companies
文献类型:期刊文献
中文题名:家族企业的“掏空”行为与会计盈余质量
英文题名:Tunneling and Earnings Quality:Evidence from Family Controlled Listed Companies
作者:王俊秋[1];张奇峰[2]
机构:[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237;[2]上海立信会计学院会计学系,上海201620
年份:2008
卷号:22
期号:1
起止页码:58
中文期刊名:上海立信会计学院学报
外文期刊名:Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce
基金:上海市教委重点课题(06ZS85);上海市教育发展基金会与上海市教委2007年曙光计划(07SG55);上海高校选拔培养优秀青年教师科研专项基金课题(27001)
语种:中文
中文关键词:掏空;盈余管理;盈余信息含量
外文关键词:tunneling; earnings management; earnings information content
摘要:以2003-2004年家族控制的上市公司为研究样本,实证考察了控制性家族的"掏空"行为对会计盈余质量的影响。研究结果表明,控制性家族的"掏空"行为加剧了公司内部人与外部投资者之间的信息不对称,降低了会计盈余的可靠性和价值相关性。上市公司的盈余管理程度与"掏空"行为显著正相关,会计盈余的信息含量与"掏空"行为显著负相关。
Using family controlled listed companies in 2003-2004 as the research sample, this paper investigates the relationship between “tunneling” and the earnings quality. The results indicate that the controlling family's “tunneling” accelerates the information asymmetry between the insider and outside investors and further decreases the reliability and relevance of the earnings. Earnings management has posi- tive correlative with the “tunneling”, while earnings information content has negative correlative with he “tunneling”.
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