详细信息
Secure Distributed Consensus Estimation under False Data Injection Attacks: A Defense Strategy Based on Partial Channel Coding ( EI收录)
文献类型:期刊文献
英文题名:Secure Distributed Consensus Estimation under False Data Injection Attacks: A Defense Strategy Based on Partial Channel Coding
作者:Huang, Jiahao[1]; Polycarpou, Marios M.[3]; Yang, Wen[2]; Li, Fangfei[2,4]; Tang, Yang[2]
机构:[1] School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University of Science and Technology, Hangzhou, 310023, China; [2] Key Laboratory of Smart Manufacturing in Energy Chemical Process, Ministry of Education, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, 200237, China; [3] KIOS Research and Innovation Center of Excellence, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, 1678, Cyprus; [4] School of mathematics, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, 200237, China
年份:2025
外文期刊名:arXiv
收录:EI(收录号:20250498674)
语种:英文
外文关键词:Channel coding - Errors - Image coding - Network security - Turbo codes
摘要:This article investigates the security issue caused by false data injection attacks in distributed estimation, wherein each sensor can construct two types of residues based on local estimates and neighbor information, respectively. The resource-constrained attacker can select partial channels from the sensor network and arbitrarily manipulate the transmitted data. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions to reveal system vulnerabilities, under which the attacker is able to diverge the estimation error while preserving the stealthiness of all residues. We propose two defense strategies with mechanisms of exploiting the Euclidean distance between local estimates to detect attacks, and adopting the coding scheme to protect the transmitted data, respectively. It is proven that the former has the capability to address the majority of security loopholes, while the latter can serve as an additional enhancement to the former. By employing the time-varying coding matrix to mitigate the risk of being cracked, we demonstrate that the latter can safeguard against adversaries injecting stealthy sequences into the encoded channels. Hence, drawing upon the security analysis, we further provide a procedure to select security-critical channels that need to be encoded, thereby achieving a trade-off between security and coding costs. Finally, some numerical simulations are conducted to demonstrate the theoretical results. Copyright ? 2025, The Authors. All rights reserved.
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