文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：国有股参股家族企业可抑制股价崩盘风险吗?

英文题名：Can State-owned Share Participation Curb the Stock Price Crash Risk of Family Firms?

作者：唐松莲[1];孙经纬[1];李丹蒙[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

年份：2021

卷号：23

期号：6

起止页码：3

中文期刊名：上海财经大学学报（哲学社会科学版）

外文期刊名：Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2020】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2021_2022】；

基金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71672059);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71502060);上海市哲学社会科学规划项目(2020BGL040)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：股价崩盘风险;家族企业;国有股东;混合所有制;反向混改

外文关键词：stock price crash risk;family firms;state-owned shareholders;mixed ownership;reverse mixed-ownership reform

摘要：由于我国上市家族企业"暴雷"事件频发,探究降低家族企业股价崩盘风险的有效机制刻不容缓。文章以2010-2019年A股家族企业为样本,检验国有股参股能否成为抑制家族企业股价崩盘风险的有效途径。实证研究发现:第一,国有股参股是减少我国家族企业上市公司股价崩盘的有效机制。第二,国有股东对家族企业发挥"监督效应"和"资源效应",从而抑制其股价崩盘风险。第三,从国有股维度来看,派驻董事的国有股和地方层级国有股更能有效降低家族企业股价崩盘风险。第四,从家族企业维度来看,当家族企业存在家族成员涉入或未经历代际传承时,国有股参股对其股价崩盘风险的抑制作用更显著。文章为降低家族企业上市公司股价崩盘风险、探究"反向混改"的最佳模式提供了理论依据。
The frequent occurrence of stock price crash in China’s listed family firms makes it urgent to explore effective mechanisms to reduce the stock price crash risk in family firms.This paper examines whether state-owned share participation is an effective mechanism to curb the stock price crash risk of family firms.Using the sample of China’s listed family firms from 2010 to 2019,this paper draws the following conclusions:First,state-owned share participation can significantly reduce the stock price crash risk of family firms.Furthermore,the more state-ownership and the better balance between state-owned shareholders and controlling families,the more obvious the inhibitory effect of state-owned shareholders on the stock price crash risk of family firms.Second,the inhibitory effect of state-owned shareholders on the stock price crash risk of family firms still exists after the tests of Heckman two-stage regression,PSM method and multi-period DID model.Third,state-owned shareholders reduce the stock price crash risk of family firms mainly through the“supervision effect”and the“resource effect”.Specifically,state-owned shareholders exert their“supervision effect”by reducing the degree of tax avoidance and improving the robustness of accounting policies of family firms.By optimizing the loan structure and alleviating financing constraints,state-owned shareholders exert their“resource effect”.Fourth,the inhibition degree of state-owned shareholders on the stock price crash risk of family firms is affected by whether state-owned shareholders assign directors,the level of state-owned shares,the involvement of family members,and whether family firms experience intergenerational succession.Specifically,state-owned shareholders who assign directors and locallevel state-owned shareholders are more effective in reducing the stock price crash risk of family firms,and the inhibitory effect of state-owned share participation on the stock price crash risk is more significant in family firms with family members involved and without intergenerational succession.Based on the above findings,the following conclusions can be drawn:The participation of state-owned shares in family firms is an effective mechanism to suppress the stock price crash risk of family firms in China;state-owned shareholders weaken the“tunnel effect”of controlling shareholders of family firms by the“supervision effect”and the“resource effect”;whether to assign directors,the level of state-owned shares,whether family members are involved,and whether they have experienced intergenerational succession are all important factors affecting the degree of state-owned shares curbing the stock price crash risk of family firms.This study provides an important theoretical basis for constructing a multi-dimensional risk-prevention system of stock price crash in family firms and exploring the best model of“reverse mixed-ownership reform”in the Chinese capital market.