文献类型：会议论文

英文题名：Stochastic Stability of Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma

作者：Liang, Haili[1,2];Zhou, Zhao[3];Zhang, Fan[4];Peng, Chen[1,2];Wang, Yu-Long[1,2]

机构：[1]Shanghai Univ, Shanghai Key Lab Power Stn Automat Technol, Shanghai 200444, Peoples R China;[2]Shanghai Univ, Sch Mechatron Engn & Automat, Shanghai 200444, Peoples R China;[3]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Minist Educ, Key Lab Adv Control & Optimizat Chem Proc, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[4]Southeast Univ, Sch Math, State Key Lab Intelligent Control & Decis Complex, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China

会议论文集：Australian and New Zealand Control Conference (ANZCC)

会议日期：DEC 06-08, 2018

会议地点：Swinburne Univ Technol, Melbourne, AUSTRALIA

主办单位：Swinburne Univ Technol

语种：英文

摘要：In this paper, we study two-player evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on regular graphs and identify the stochastically stable equilibria for infinite populations. We consider four different update rules: birth-death(BD), death-birth(DB), imitation(IM) and pairwise comparison(PC). With the same values of cost and benefit of cooperation, we show that there is a unique stochastically stable equilibrium for evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on regular graphs. If the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than k + 2 (k is the degree of a regular graph), the networked game has a higher fraction of cooperators than that for a well-mixed population. Under certain conditions, the lower graph connectivity can lead to the emergence of more cooperators. Besides theoretical analysis, we demonstrate our results through numerical computations and simulations as well.