文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：CEO network centrality and bank risk: Evidence from US Bank holding companies

作者：Fan, Yaoyao[1];Jiang, Yuxiang[2];Jin, Pengcheng[3];Mai, Yong[4]

机构：[1]Soochow Univ, Business Sch, Suzhou, Peoples R China;[2]Galaxy Asset Management, Res Div, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[3]Fudan Univ, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[4]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 MeiLong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2023

卷号：83

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:001105982700001)】；

基金：This manuscript is supported by the [Major Research Program of Natural Science Foundation of China] under [Grant number 92146002] . The authors thank the journal editor Merton Bennedsen and the two anonymous reviewers for their vlauable comments and suggestions.

语种：英文

外文关键词：CEO network centrality; Bank risk; Deaths and retirements of executives/directors; Bank holding companies (BHCs)

摘要：We investigate the impact of CEO network centrality, a central position in a social network, on bank risk. Using a sample of 471 bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US from 1999 to 2018, we find that CEO network centrality is negatively related to bank risk and this is due to CEOs with higher levels of network centrality implementing less risky policies. Additionally, we find that information flow and CEO power are two channels through which CEO network centrality reduces bank risk. Our empirical results still hold when we employ a battery of methods to mitigate endogeneity issues. Our research further extends a new strand of studies focusing on the specific position/hierarchy of executives/directors in a social network.