文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：New axioms for immediate acceptance

作者：Chen, Yajing[1]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2016

卷号：20

期号：4

起止页码：329

外文期刊名：REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000387136400003)】；

语种：英文

外文关键词：Immediate acceptance algorithm; Favoring higher ranks; Characterization

摘要：Following Kojima and nver (Econ Theory 55(3):515-544, 2014) and Afacan (Math Soc Sci 66(2):176-179, 2013), this paper provides two characterizations of the Boston school choice mechanism determined by the student-proposing immediate acceptance algorithm. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism if and only if it satisfies one of the following two groups of axioms: favoring higher ranks and weak fairness; favoring higher ranks, rank monotonicity, and rank rationality.