文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Toward Zero-Determinant Strategies for Optimal Decision Making in Crowdsourcing Systems

作者：Wang, Jiali[1,2];Tang, Changbing[3];Lu, Jianquan[4];Chen, Guanrong[5]

机构：[1]Zhejiang Normal Univ, Coll Math & Comp Sci, Jinhua 321004, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Key Lab Smart Mfg Energy Chem Proc, Minist Educ, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[3]Zhejiang Normal Univ, Coll Phys & Elect Informat Engn, Jinhua 321004, Peoples R China;[4]Southeast Univ, Sch Math, Nanjing 210096, Peoples R China;[5]City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Elect Engn, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

年份：2023

卷号：11

期号：5

外文期刊名：MATHEMATICS

收录：;WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000947679700001)】；

基金：This work was partly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 62103375) and the Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China (No. LY22F030006).

语种：英文

外文关键词：optimal strategies; iterated games; ZD strategies; winner-takes-all; incomplete information

摘要：The crowdsourcing system is an internet-based distributed problem-solving and production organization model, which has been applied in human-computer interaction, databases, natural language processing, machine learning and other fields. It guides the public to complete some tasks through specific strategies and methods. However, rational and selfish workers in crowdsourcing systems will submit solutions of different qualities in order to maximize their own benefits. Therefore, how to choose optimal strategies for selfish workers to maximize their benefits is important and crucial in such a scenario. In this paper, we propose a decision optimization method with incomplete information in a crowdsourcing system based on zero-determinant (ZD) strategies to help workers make optimal decisions. We first formulate the crowdsourcing problem, where workers have "winner-takes-all" rules as an iterated game with incomplete information. Subsequently, we analyze the optimal decision of workers in crowdsourcing systems in terms of ZD strategies, for which we find conditions to reach the maximum payoff of a focused worker. In addition, the analysis helps understand what solutions selfish workers will submit under the condition of having incomplete information. Finally, numerical simulations illustrate the performances of different strategies and the effects of the parameters on the payoffs of the focused worker.