文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：公共教育支出对家庭代际投资决策的影响——基于世代交叠模型的分析

英文题名：Effects of Public Education Expenditure on Household Intergenerational Investment Decision:An Analysis Based on the Overlapping Generation Model

作者：杨继波[1];吴柏钧[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

年份：2015

卷号：41

期号：12

起止页码：135

中文期刊名：经济管理

外文期刊名：Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2014】；社科基金资助期刊;CSSCI:【CSSCI2014_2016】；

基金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目"政府主导下代际公共品有效供给的市场化路径"(14YJC790154);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金项目"公共教育支出对家庭代际投资决策的影响"(WN1422025)

语种：中文

中文关键词：世代交叠模型;养老保险;挤出效应;公共教育支出

外文关键词：overlapping generation model; pension insurance; crowding out effect; public education expenditure;

摘要：本文以每个家庭有三代人为例,即少年(受教育期)、中年(工作期)和老年(退休期),通过世代交叠模型,利用1998—2011年数据探讨中年期在有限收入约束下权衡进行前向型代际品子女教育和后向型代际品养老保险的投资,在利己动机和利他性动机同时作用的前提下,分析政府公共教育支出对家庭代际品投资的影响,进一步讨论政府加大公共教育支出对不同收入家庭的代际投资决策产生的效果。实证发现,公共教育支出的增加对低收人家庭子女教育的挤出效应更加明显,但同时公共教育支出增加会促进家庭加大代际养老保险的投资。理论和实证结果引导政府在公共教育支出方面应该加强对低收人家庭的补贴,这不仅解决了低收入家庭子女教育的资金问题,同时也能有效缓解目前中国人口老龄化的养老保障问题。
This paper explores the optimal choice between the offspring education investment（forward intergenerational goods） and the pension insurance（backward intergenerational goods） with budget constraint in an overlapping generation model framework.Each households has three generations;young,middle and old.The young generation receives education from their parents,the middle age.The middle generation works and makes two kinds of investments：their children＇s education and their own pension insurance.The old generation retires and lives on the pension they saved when working.If people are egoistic,middle generation tends to invest on pension insurance rather than education.The unique Chinese culture,however,indicates that many Chinese parents will not overlook their children＇s education.On the one hand,Chinese parents are more concerned about their children＇s education and generally hold greater ambition for them.On the other hand,Chinese parents may depend on their children when getting old,and thus regard their children＇s bright future as an investment return,with a belief that the more successful of the children,the higher return rate they get.The existing literature focus on intra-generation topics while more studies support the claim that household education investment has a remarkable influence on young generation＇s education outcome.Most of the current education policy discussions concentrate on the spending and distribution of government expenditure only and the study on inter-generational topics are scant.Even if there are a few studies,they all assume that people are purely egoistic or purely altruistic.On the studies of inter-generation public goods,the usual practice is to compare the forward looking products with backward looking products.Most of the current research investigates this issue from the macro level,and solely analyzes the role of government in the model and the policy setting afterwards.Only a few studies pioneer into the micro level,or,the term of ＂households＂ in this paper.Moreover,the current studies emphasizes the effects of old care social security on inter-generational education,while fails to explain how the public expenditure will affect the household＇s investment decision.Therefore,when assumed neither purely egoistic nor altruistic,parents face an optimal balance between the children education investment and the pension insurance investment They think highly of their children and invest generously on the young generation＇s education,but they will also think of their own future by accumulating pension insurances as much as possible.The paper contributes both to theory and to practice.In theory,this paper analyzes the effects of public education expenditure on pension insurance investment by proposing two hypotheses;the first is that public education will crowd out private education investment,and the second is that it will increase pension investment.Moreover,in practice,this paper confirms the two hypothesis with the data from 1998—2011,showing that empirically,the public education expenditure indeed crowds out private education investment,especially for the low income group.Also,the pension insurance investment and education investment rival each other for households.That＇s to say,one＇s increase will result in a decrease in the other.Yet the effects are complicated.Specifically,an increase in education investment results in a significant decrease in pension insurance.An increase in pension insurance,however,only leads to a marginal decrease in education investment,suggesting that the altruistic motive is much stronger in China.These conclusions in this paper have important policy implications.For example,they strongly suggest that the government education expenditure should lean toward to low income group,which is not only an effective way to mitigate the aggravating unfairness in education through inter-generational mobility,but also is crucial to ease the social security problem with an ageing population.