文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Collective action and spontaneity cycles: Cascading dynamics under Bayesian games

作者：Ding, FangYiKuang[1]; Xu, Jie[1]; Li, Mingke[1]

机构：[1] Department of sociology, East China University of science and technology, Shanghai, China

年份：2023

外文期刊名：arXiv

收录：EI(收录号：20230293114)

语种：英文

外文关键词：Game theory

摘要：The formation mechanisms and cyclical conditions of collective action have become open issues in research involving public choice, social movements, and more. For this reason, on the basis of rational decision-making and social assimilation, this paper proposes an action model that combines Bayesian game and social network dynamics, and incorporates exogenous cycles into it. For this model, this paper proves the spontaneous action theorem and action cycle theorem of collective action, and based on numerical simulation and empirical calibration, further confirms the theoretical mechanism involving elements such as risk/risk-free incentives and the number of social ties. Based on such conclusions and evidence, this paper proposes a theory of spontaneous cycles as an integrative answer to the open question of collective action formation/cycles. ? 2023, CC BY.