文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：子公司数量、信息不对称与大股东掏空

英文题名：Subsidiary Number,Information Asymmetry and Large Shareholders’Tunneling

作者：宋渊洋[1];徐峰[2];黄明[3]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237;[2]萍乡学院马克思主义学院,萍乡337055;[3]复旦大学经济学院,上海200433

年份：2026

卷号：38

期号：1

起止页码：14

中文期刊名：管理评论

外文期刊名：Management Review

收录：;北大核心:【北大核心2023】；

基金：国家自然科学基金项目(72272051,71972050);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2022BGL005)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：子公司数量;大股东掏空;信息不对称;数字化;控制权

外文关键词：the number of subsidiary;large shareholders’tunneling;information asymmetry;digitalization;control right

摘要：随着跨地区经营的持续推进,中国企业设立了大量子公司。数量庞大的子公司会提升企业经营复杂性,加剧中小股东和企业之间的信息不对称,为大股东利用控制权优势攫取私利提供了便利。本研究探讨子公司数量对大股东掏空的影响机理,揭示子公司数量增加伴随的负面公司治理后果。以2003—2022年沪深A股上市企业作为样本,基于企业固定效应模型和工具变量回归等方法的分析结果表明:子公司数量越多,中小股东与企业之间的信息不对称程度越高,越难以监督大股东,导致大股东掏空越严重。进一步的分析表明,企业数字化程度能弱化子公司数量对信息不对称的影响,从而使子公司数量对大股东掏空的正向影响被弱化;大股东控制权比例能强化信息不对称对大股东掏空的影响,从而使子公司数量对大股东掏空的正向影响被强化。上述研究结论有助于更全面地认识子公司数量增加伴随的负面公司治理后果,对企业规划子公司设立和降低子公司数量增加伴随的负面影响有重要启示。
With the continuous advancement of regional diversification,Chinese firms have established many subsidiaries.The increasing number of subsidiaries enhances the complexity of corporate operations and exacerbates the information asymmetry between minority shareholders and the firm,thereby leaving room for major shareholders to take advantage of control rights for their own benefits.This study investigates the mechanism by which the number of subsidiaries affects the tunneling activities of major shareholders,and reveals the negative corporate governance consequences resulting from the increasing number of subsidiaries.Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2022,and using firm fixed-effects models and instrumental variable regressions,the analysis concludes that a greater number of subsidiaries leads to more severe information asymmetry between minority shareholders and the firm,making it more difficult to monitor major shareholders,hence more significant tunneling by major shareholders.Further analysis indicates that firm digitalization can mitigate the impact of subsidiary network expansion on information asymmetry,thereby reducing the positive effect of the number of subsidiaries on major shareholders’tunneling activities.Conversely,the control rights of major shareholders can intensify the impact of information asymmetry on their tunneling activities,leading to a stronger positive effect of subsidiary numbers on tunneling by major shareholders.These conclusions contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the corporate governance consequences associated with the number of subsidiaries and provide important insights for firms to plan their subsidiary network and mitigate the negative impacts resulting from subsidiary network expansion.