文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Cost-based subsidy and performance-based subsidy in a manufacturing-recycling system considering product eco-design

作者：Yu, Hong[1];Chang, Xiangyun[1];Liu, Wenjie[2]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Management Sci & Engn, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]Nanjing Univ Aeronaut & Astronaut, Coll Econ & Management, Nanjing 211106, Peoples R China

年份：2021

卷号：327

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION

收录：;EI(收录号：20214311083704);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000735847700004)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000735847700004)】；

基金：The study is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (72074078, 71473085, and 71871117), the Shanghai Natural Science Foundation (20ZR1413300), and the Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities of China.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Government subsidy; Manufacturing-recycling system; Eco-design; Game theory

摘要：Using the Stackelberg game theory, this paper evaluates the effectiveness of four subsidy schemes on the product eco-design and recycling rate in a manufacturing-recycling system that comprises a government, a manufacturer and a recycler. The principal results are: 1) For the cost-based subsidies, a fixed-cost subsidy to recyclers always yields higher recycling rate and social welfare. For the performance-based subsidies, the effects are closely related to market demand and the fixed cost coefficients of eco-design and recycling. Governments should select subsidy schemes according to the specific goals and market conditions. 2) Four subsidy schemes are the effective forces to promote product eco-design and recycling. Higher subsidy intensity brings better supply chain profits and better environment performance, but it does not always bring better social welfare. 3) Eco-design can increase waste recycling rates effectively, and recycling rates are more sensitive to eco-design when the government subsidizes the fixed costs of recyclers.