文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Endogenous Price Leadership and the Strategic Acquisition of Information

作者：Gilpatric, Scott M.[1,2];Li, Youping[3]

机构：[1]Univ Tennessee, Dept Econ, 527C Stokely Management Ctr, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA;[2]Univ Tennessee, Corp Governance Ctr, 527C Stokely Management Ctr, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA;[3]E China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2016

卷号：82

期号：3

起止页码：859

外文期刊名：SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000370078400010)】；

基金：The authors wish to thank Bill Neilson, Rudy Santore, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Li acknowledges the support from the Shanghai Pujiang Talents Program. The usual disclaimers apply.

语种：英文

摘要：We model a differentiated Bertrand duopoly in which a firm's earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. In such a setting with second-mover advantage, we then study the firms' incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game. Both (i) neither firm acquiring information and (ii) one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium, but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome, even if information is free. Information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition.