文献类型：会议论文

英文题名：Competitive stock-replenishment policies in a two-stage supply chain

作者：Liu, Qing[1]; Huang, Dao[1]

机构：[1] Research Institute of Automation, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai 200237, China

会议论文集：International Conference on Transportation Engineering 2007, ICTE 2007

会议日期：July 22, 2007 - July 24, 2007

会议地点：Chengdu, China

语种：英文

外文关键词：Game theory - Inventory control - Product design - Public policy

摘要：We investigate stock-replenishment problem in a one-warehouse-n-retailer supply chain, in which warehouse supplies single product to n-retailers. When supply chain is designed to gain optimal system cost, some firms intend to deviate the agreement to maximize their profit, and such kind of deviation may cause supply chain inefficiency. In this paper, game theory is used as a tool to balance profit among retailers. When retailers replenish their stock in a Nash Equilibrium, each can maximize own profit while pondering other retailers. Mathematical model for this n-retailer game is constructed. And at last, we prove that there exists at least one equilibrium in this game. ? copyright ASCE 2007.