文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Price leadership in a vertically differentiated market

作者：Li, Youping

机构：[1]E China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2014

卷号：38

起止页码：67

外文期刊名：ECONOMIC MODELLING

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000334137900008)】；

语种：英文

外文关键词：Vertical differentiation; Price leadership; Endogenous timing; Welfare

摘要：This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes under simultaneous and sequential price settings in a vertically differentiated market. When the timing of the price game is determined endogenously, it is shown that the sequential play with the high quality firm leading emerges, yielding the highest industry profit but the lowest social welfare among the different timings. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.