文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：民营企业利益侵夺倾向与控制权收购模式选择

英文题名：Private Firms ’ Tendency to Expropriate the Minority Shareholders and Mode Choice in the Acquisition of Corporate Control

作者：于鸣[1,2];汪金爱[3]

机构：[1]北京大学博士后流动站,北京100871;[2]中国工商银行博士后工作站,北京100032;[3]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

年份：2013

卷号：15

期号：4

起止页码：89

中文期刊名：上海财经大学学报（哲学社会科学版）

外文期刊名：Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2011】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2012_2013】；

基金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助

语种：中文

中文关键词：潜在利益侵夺倾向;收购模式选择;股东之间的代理冲突

外文关键词：potential tendency to expropriate the minority shareholders~ mode choice inthe acquisition of corporate control~ principal-principal agency conflict

摘要：控制权收购可分为一次性收购和循序收购两种模式。文章认为循序收购可被归结为防御机制,这种防御机制旨在发现和约束那些可能对中小股东构成利益侵夺的收购方。文章在对1998-2006年中国A股市场发生的民营企业作为收购方的上市公司控制权收购案例进行研究后,发现具有潜在利益侵夺倾向的收购方更有可能选择循序收购而非一次性收购。这一发现将对公司治理中控股股东与其他中小股东利益冲突的研究从事后阶段推向了事前阶段。
The acquisition of corporate control can he classified into one-time and sequen- tial acquisition modes. This paper takes sequential acquisition as a defense mechanism aiming to detect and discipline the potential acquirers expropriating the minority shareholders. This paper makes an empirical study of acquisition cases of corporate control with regard to ac- quirers in the Chinese A-share market from 2001 to 2006, and arrives at the conclusion that acquirers with potential tendency to expropriate the minority shareholders are more likely to choose a sequential acquisition mode rather than a one-time acquisition mode. This conclu- sion changes the research on principal-principal agency conflicts in corporate governance from ex post stage to ex ante stage.