文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：How Does a Regulatory Minority Shareholder Influence the ESG Performance? A Quasi-Natural Experiment

作者：Song, Di[1];Xu, Canyu[2];Fu, Zewei[1];Yang, Chao[3]

机构：[1]China Univ Polit Sci & Law, Business Sch, Beijing 100088, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Business Sch, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[3]Beijing Wuzi Univ, Sch Accountancy, Beijing 101149, Peoples R China

年份：2023

卷号：15

期号：7

外文期刊名：SUSTAINABILITY

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000970314100001)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000970314100001)】；

基金：This research was funded by [National Social Science Fund Youth Program] grant number [22CGL010], [China Postdoctoral Science Foundation] grant number [2021M701194], [Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities] grant number [JKN02222203] and [Shanghai Soft Science Projects] grant number [23692121000].

语种：英文

外文关键词：China Securities Investor Services Center; minority shareholder protection; ESG performance; supervision capability; information transparency

摘要：Based on China's newly established Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a minority shareholder protection mechanism, we investigated how the CSISC shareholder influences the ESG performance of listed companies. Using a difference-in-differences analysis for a sample of Chinese listed companies during 2013-2017, we found that the pilot reform of CSISC shareholding has a positive influence on the ESG performance of listed companies. We also found that this effect exists in large companies and in companies in non-high-polluting industries. Besides, analysts' attention, external auditing quality, institutional shareholding, and highly-developed market intermediary and legal systems can strengthen the effect of CSISC shareholding on corporate ESG performance. Our findings inspire regulators in emerging markets to establish suitable mechanisms to protect minority shareholder rights in the long run.