文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：基于博弈均衡的中小企业融资契约安排

英文题名：On the Financing Contract Arrangement of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises(SMEs)Based on the Game Equilibrium

作者：葛永盛[1];童盼[2]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237;[2]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048

年份：2012

期号：4

起止页码：183

中文期刊名：金融研究

外文期刊名：Journal of Financial Research

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2011】；社科基金资助期刊;CSSCI:【CSSCI2012_2013】；

基金：国家社会科学基金(10CGL002);国家自然科学基金(71172079)的资助

语种：中文

中文关键词：中小企业融资;关系专用性投资;契约安排;博弈均衡

外文关键词：Small and Medium-sized Enterprises （SMEs） Financing, Relationship-specific Investment, Contract Arrangement, Game Equilibrium

摘要：融资难是制约我国中小企业发展的瓶颈,也是摆在广大研究工作者面前的重大课题。本文从关系专用性投资的视角,考察了中小企业对融资关系的处理以及融资契约的安排,通过数学建模检验了静态博弈的非效率性,以及动态博弈下不同融资模式的子博弈完美纳什均衡的参与约束条件,进而为解决我国中小企业融资难问题提出了政策性建议。
Financing difficulty, the major problem of small and medium-sized enterprises （SMEs） in our country, has become the bottleneck restraining their development. From the perspective of relationship-specific investment, this paper explores how SMEs deal with financing relationships and arrange financing contracts, and furthermore it tests the non-efficiency of static game, and the individual participation constraint conditions of the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of diverse financing models of dynamic game through mathematical modeling. Finally the paper puts forward some strategic suggestions in order to solve the financing problem for the Chinese SMEs.