文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Radio-frequency identification (RFID) adoption with inventory misplacement under retail competition

作者：Zhang, Li-Hao[1];Li, Tian[2];Fan, Ti-Jun[2]

机构：[1]Shanghai Maritime Univ, Logist Res Ctr, Shanghai 201306, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2018

卷号：270

期号：3

起止页码：1028

外文期刊名：EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH

收录：;EI(收录号：20182105231831);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000438660400020)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000438660400020)】；

基金：The authors sincerely thank the editor, Ruud Teunter, and three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions that help improve the quality of the study. Li-Hao Zhang was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71601114). Tian Li, the corresponding author, was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71671067, 71301050), Shanghai Pujiang Program (13PJC022) and the Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities(WN1516010). Ti-Jun Fan was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71431004).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Game theory; Radio-frequency identification (RFID); Supply chain management; Retail competition; Inventory misplacement

摘要：We investigate RFID adoption strategies in a decentralized supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers both of whom face inventory misplacement problems. If a retailer adopts RFID, his misplacement problem is resolved. Retailer 1 is a Stackelberg leader in the retail market and Retailer 2 is a follower. The two retailers sequentially make decisions on whether or not to adopt RFID. After that, the manufacturer offers a wholesale price contract to a non-RFID adoption retailer or a cost -sharing contract to an RFID adoption retailer, and delivers products with(without) RFID tags to the RFID (non-RFID) adoption retailer. The two retailers then sequentially determine their retail prices to engage in price competition. We fully characterize the equilibrium on RFID adoption, contracts and retail prices. It is shown that the equilibrium RFID adoption strategies depend on the competition intensity, misplacement rates, and RFID tagging cost. We highlight the strategic role of RFID adoption in a competitive market: when the unit RFID tagging cost is intermediate, the two retailers use differentiated RFID adoption strategies such that exactly one of them adopts RFID. With more intense competition, a retailer can be more likely to adopt RFID, identifying competition as a key driving force of RFID adoption. Both retailers adopting RFID cannot be an equilibrium when the competition intensity is low. If only one retailer adopts RFID technology, he pays the manufacturer the same price for an RFID-tagged item regardless of whether or not the other retailer adopts the technology. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.