文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：INFORMATION VALUE UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET LEADERSHIP

作者：Gilpatric, Scott M.[1];Li, Youping[2]

机构：[1]Univ Tennessee, Dept Econ, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA;[2]E China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2015

卷号：53

期号：1

起止页码：589

外文期刊名：ECONOMIC INQUIRY

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000345350200034)】；

语种：英文

摘要：In an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods, we identify the circumstance under which a firm's having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership. High demand volatility leads to Stackelberg competition with the information-advantaged firm leading. In the N-firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously. In a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither, one, or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm's obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor. Both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and Stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium, but only when firms have different costs of information. Our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first-mover advantage such as certain public good provision games. (JEL C72, D82, L13)