文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Vertical separation with location-price competition

作者：Li, Youping[1];Shuai, Jie[2]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Wenlan Sch Business, 182 Nanhu Ave, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R China

年份：2017

卷号：121

期号：3

起止页码：255

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000403047800003)】；

基金：We wish to thank the editor, Giacomo Corneo, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71603083, 71603283) is gratefully acknowledged.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Vertical separation; Vertical integration; Location-price competition

摘要：While the literature has generally found that vertical separation helps buffer competition and harm consumers in a duopolistic market, we find the exact opposite. To induce the retailers to locate closer to consumers and earn a larger market share, the manufacturers set wholesale prices below marginal cost. This market share effect dominates the previously focused coordination effect under which a higher wholesale price helps coordinate the retailers' pricing decisions. For each manufacturer, vertical separation is a dominant strategy so the endogenous determination of vertical separation versus vertical integration is a prisoner's dilemma game.