文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Network Parameter Coordinated False Data Injection Attacks Against Power System AC State Estimation

作者：Liu, Chensheng[1];Liang, Hao[2];Chen, Tongwen[2]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Key Lab Adv Control & Optimizat Chem Proc, Minist Educ, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]Univ Alberta, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Edmonton, AB T6G 1H9, Canada

年份：2021

卷号：12

期号：2

起止页码：1626

外文期刊名：IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID

收录：;EI(收录号：20211010034449);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000623420700059)】；

基金：The work of Chensheng Liu was supported in part by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61988101 (Basic Science Center Program) and Grant 62073138.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Transmission line measurements; State estimation; Voltage measurement; Power measurement; Coordinate measuring machines; Power systems; Phase measurement; False data injection attacks; network parameter attacks; power system cyber-security; power system state estimation

摘要：False data injection (FDI) attacks have recently been introduced as an important class of cyber-attacks against power system state estimation. Utilizing vulnerabilities in information systems, attackers can inject well-constructed false data and stealthily misguide results of state estimation. However, only measurements, such as power flows and bus injections, are coordinately modified in FDI attacks, which may result in a larger number of modified measurements in constructing such attacks. In this article, we propose a network parameter coordinated false data injection (NP-FDI) attack to reduce the number of attacked measurements, where expected changes of system states and modifications of network parameters are well coordinated. Analysis of minimal attack set at a single line gives feasible conditions in reducing the number of attacked measurements. A sparse attack strategy is designed to obtain the minimal attack set of the whole grid, which can also be applied to cases with incomplete topology information. An extension to NP-FDI attacks with incomplete line impedance is presented, where the required line impedance can be estimated from local measurements adjacent to the targeted branch. Based on simulations in the IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus test systems, performance of the proposed NP-FDI attacks on sparsity and stealth are evaluated.