文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Designing optimal and practical volume discounting contracts for the dominant retailer with information asymmetry

作者：Wang, Yao-Yu[1];Tao, Feng[2];Wang, Jian-Cai[3]

机构：[1]Soochow Univ, Dongwu Business Sch, Suzhou, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[3]Beijing Inst Technol, Sch Management & Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China

年份：2017

卷号：24

期号：6

起止页码：1405

外文期刊名：INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH

收录：;EI(收录号：20153801285446);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000405576800009)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000405576800009)】；

基金：The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees whose relevant suggestions have contributed to improve the paper. This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) Projects No. 71301113, 71271030, 71432002 and 71201059, and the Philosophy and Social Science Research Grand of Jiangsu Province 2013SJB6300081.

语种：英文

外文关键词：supply chain management; newsvendor product; volume discounting contracts; dominant retailer; information asymmetry

摘要：With the increasing prevalence of huge international retail chains and the subcontracting of manufacturing to developing countries by owners of major international brands, the dominant-retailer-oriented incentive contracts become increasingly more relevant. The literature suggests that most of the contract formats known as channel-coordinating for the dominant supplier become quite or totally ineffective when the retailer is the dominant player in the supply chain. A menu of contracts is shown to be theoretically most effective for the dominant retailer; however, it is too complex to be implemented in the real world. This paper first proves that the menu of contracts is actually a nonlinear volume discounting contract. Based on this characteristic, we propose two contract formats, namely, volume discounting on markup and volume discounting on slotting fee. Our results show that these two new proposed schemes perform substantially better than the currently most-used contract formats (e.g., markup contract formats), and they can also be perceived as performing nearly as well as the menu of contracts.