文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：“河长制”能实现地方政府跨域间的协同治理吗--基于“碎片化治理”的视角

英文题名：Can“River Chief System”Realize the Collaborative Governance among Local Governments?From the Perspective of“Fragmented Governance”

作者：徐娟[1];马佳骏[2];邵帅[3];黎娇龙[1]

机构：[1]中南财经政法大学统计与数学学院,430074;[2]上海财经大学经济学院;[3]华东理工大学商学院

年份：2022

卷号：51

期号：4

起止页码：50

中文期刊名：南方经济

外文期刊名：South China Journal of Economics

收录：国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2020】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2021_2022】；

基金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“推动能源供给侧与消费侧协同绿色发展促进人与自然和谐共生研究”(21ZDA084);国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“流域水污染协同治理问题研究”(21FJYB038);国家自然科学基金项目“高新技术自主创新知识产权价值评估与融资决策研究”(71974204);湖北省教育厅项目“长江流域‘河长制’政策的长效机制研究--基于‘成本-收益’角度”(B2021007)资助。

语种：中文

中文关键词：河长制;跨区域协同治理;碎片化治理

外文关键词：River Chief System;Trans-regional Collaborative Governance;Fragmented Governance

摘要：“河长制”这一创新政策试图通过河长之间的沟通协调来有效实现水污染治理目标,但该政策能否有效解决因流域治理的跨域特征而导致的碎片化管辖和协同治理困境,现有文献对此尚未予以关注。文章首先利用博弈模型和逻辑推演阐释了碎片化治理本身对水污染治理及对河长制政策实施效果的潜在影响,进而基于2007-2018年中国七大流域覆盖的干流县域数据,结合中国生态环境部实施的国家重点监控点的水质数据,对提出的理论假说进行了系统的实证检验。结果显示,我国的流域治理中确实存在明显的碎片化问题,且主要集中在中上游地区,原因在于中上游地区多为经济欠发达地区,其占优策略为被动等待,而下游地区主要为经济发达地区,其占优策略为主动治理,导致下游监管较强、中上游监管较弱而出现污染产业“逆流而上”的现象。同时,河长制能产生水污染治理改善的效果,但尚未解决跨区域协同治理困境,这也正是目前实施的河长制政策的主要局限,亟需后续推行过程中的进一步完善。文章揭示了河长制治理过程中的跨区域碎片化导致的协同治理困境问题,并为此问题提供了实证依据,有利于政府在执行过程中重点关注跨区域的协同合作治理,为政府进一步建立跨区域的河长制协同治理制度提供了决策依据。
After Cyanobacteria in Taihu lake broke out and triggered water supply crisis in 2007,Wuxi city began an innovation attempt on the watershed management mechanism in August of that year-“River Chief System”-the main officials in charge of the party and government at all levels serve as the“river chief”,responsible for river and lake pollution control in their jurisdiction,and only by achieving annual goals of pollution control can they be promoted or selected excellent.This innovation of basin governance was then quickly imitated by other cities,and was officially promoted nationwide in 2018 in an attempt to solve the“fragmented governance dilemma”faced by traditional water governance with central intervening by clarifying the vertical allocation of goals and responsibilities and driving horizontal coordination and communication mechanisms.However,the existing literature has not been concerned about the effect of this policy yet.Based on data from 2007-2018 on the main stream counties covered by seven major Chinese watersheds,as well as the water quality data from national key monitoring sites implemented by the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment,this paper analyzes two topics:First,is there a fragmentation jurisdiction problem in water governance?Can the River Chief System effectively address the issue of fragmented jurisdiction among regions?Second,if it cannot be solved,how would the negative impact of fragmented jurisdiction be manifested?Would it affect the effectiveness of the River Chief System in the pollution control?The results first show that there is a significant fragmented jurisdiction problem in basingovernance,and it is mainly concentrated in the regions of middle and upper reaches.The reason is that most of the upper and middle reaches are economically underdeveloped areas with the“passive waiting”dominant strategy while the downstream areas are mainly in economic developed regions with the“active governance”dominant strategy.Since it inevitably leads to the weaker supervision in the middle and upper reaches,the phenomenon of the“counterflow of polluting industry”appears.Also,it was found that the River Chief System Policy can improve the effectiveness of water pollution control,but it has not yet solved the cross-regional coordinated governance dilemma,which is precisely the limitation of this policy and requires further improvement in the process of subsequent implementation.The contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in the following aspects:First,with both theoretical induction and quantitative empirical evidence,the fragmented jurisdictional problem of collaborative governance faced in the river chief system is explored for the first time.Second,it focuses on the differences between the middle and upper reaches of the river and the lower reaches of the river in fragmentation jurisdiction,and verifies the possibility of“counterflow of pollutants”under the unbalanced supervision revealing the tragedy of the commons.Third,the focus on cross-regional collaboration and the empirical examination of these can help to uncover the synergies of jurisdiction in watershed governance and provide feasible solutions to the“ecological communities”.In conclusion,this article draws attention to the coordination failure caused by the trans-regional fragmentation in the governance of the River Chief System,which is conducive to providing the government with a focus on cross-regional collaborative governance in the implementation process and a realistic basis to further establish the trans-regionally collaborative river chief governance system.