文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：存在竞争性制造商的需求预测信息的共享研究

英文题名：Demand Forecast Sharing in a Supply Chain with Competing Manufacturers

作者：陈琳[1];李田[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200232

年份：2016

卷号：24

期号：S1

起止页码：711

中文期刊名：中国管理科学

外文期刊名：Chinese Journal of Management Science

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2014】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2014_2016】；

基金：中央高校基本科研业务费(WN1321002;WN1516010)

语种：中文

中文关键词：信息共享;需求信息预测;推断效应;价格竞争

外文关键词：information sharing;;demand forecast;;price competition;;inference effect

摘要：本文针对两个竞争性制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,考虑各制造商拥有需求预测信息,信息共享如何影响批发价格和零售价格的问题,在完全信息共享、部分信息共享、无信息共享的情形下,基于价格竞争,通过建立博弈模型,分析了信息精度、竞争强度对批发价格和零售价格的影响,对比预期均衡利润,进而得出制造商的信息共享决策和信息共享成立条件。研究表明:制造商不信息共享时,零售商可以从批发价格推断信息,从而产生定价扭曲,使零售商受益却使制造商受损,制造商间的横向竞争能够减轻这种影响但并不能完全抵消,因而制造商都会选择信息共享来避免推断效应的不利影响,当且仅当信息共享时能够提高供应链的运作效率降低零售商的成本来弥补它的损失,信息共享协议才会成立。最后,通过算例对研究结论进行了直观考察和说明。
Large-scale manufacturers often face highly uncertain demand when launching new products or expanding into new markets. Thus, information sharing in a distribution channel where both manufacturers possess better demand-forecast information than the downstream retailer is studied. Three information-sharing scenarios:full information sharing,partial information sharing,and no information sharing,are examined. How information precision and competition intensity influence the equilibrium prices is analyzed. Then the equilibrium outcomes under the three sharing formats are characterized and the firms' preferences over these scenarios are investigated. It is shown that,in the absence of information sharing,the retailer is able to use the wholesale price to infer the manufacturer's private signal. This creates a pricing distortion which benefits the retailer. Sharing the information with the retailer of the manufacturer's private signal eliminates this distortion. In general, manufacturers benefit from more information sharing at the loss of downstream retailer. Hence,information sharing arrangements in equilibrium require sufficient cost savings(e. g.,reduced inventory costs).