文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Emission reduction cooperation between electric vehicle manufacturers and charging facilities operators under the dual-credit policy and the subsidy policy

作者：Peng, Liangui[1];Li, Ying[2];Yin, Lvjiang[1]

机构：[1]Hubei Univ Automot Technol, Sch Econ & Management, 167 Checheng West Rd, Shiyan 442002, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2025

卷号：203

外文期刊名：COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING

收录：;EI(收录号：20251218080367);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001467439900001)】；

基金：This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.72074076) , Doctoral Scientific Research Foundation of Hubei University of Automotive Technology (BK202442)

语种：英文

外文关键词：Dual-credit policy; Subsidy policy for charging facility; Game theory; Contract mechanism; Emission reduction decisions

摘要：The dual-credit policy (DCP) for vehicle manufacturers and the subsidy policy for charging facilities (SPCF) have become key policies to promote carbon emission reduction and green consumption. However, few studies discuss the effect of the combination policy and the synergy decision for emission reduction between charging facility operators and electric vehicle (EV) manufacturers. To fill this gap, this study analyses the effect of the combination policy and discusses the synergistic strategy (the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract) between charging facility operators and EV manufacturers. Some findings were obtained by analysing the results of game models. Firstly, the DCP has a good synergy effect with the SPCF on the emission reduction decisions of vehicle manufacturers and charging facility operators. The SPCF can offset the negative effects of the gradually decreasing credit price. Secondly, the contract design increases revenues of charging facility operators and EV manufacturers, which increases the emission reduction effect of the policy. In the absence of the SPCF, the cost sharing contract is an effective market mechanism to incentivize the emission reduction decisions of charging facility operators and EV manufacturers. It is interesting to note that both charging facility operators and EV manufacturers prefer the revenue-sharing contract to the cost-sharing contract. Thirdly, surprisingly, while tightening the DCP or increasing the SPCF augmented the revenues of charging facility operators and EV manufacturers, it failed to promote closer cooperation between them. In contrast, consumer green preferences have exerted an incentive effect in the opposite direction.