文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：PRICING AND MODULARITY DECISIONS UNDER COMPETITION

作者：Tao, Feng[1];Shao, Hao[2,3];Lai, Kinkeung[4,5]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Management Sci & Engn, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]Shanghai Univ Int Business & Econ, Gubei Rd, Shanghai 200336, Peoples R China;[3]Shanghai Wage Intelligent Technol Co Ltd, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[4]Shenzhen Univ, Coll Econ, Shenzhen, Peoples R China;[5]Shaanxi Normal Univ, Int Business Sch, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China

年份：2020

卷号：16

期号：1

起止页码：289

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL AND MANAGEMENT OPTIMIZATION

收录：;EI(收录号：20202508848412);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000492769200016)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000492769200016)】；

基金：We thank Professor Kok Lay Teo (EIC), and three anonymous reviews for their valuable comments and suggestions that helped improve the model and analysis presented in this paper. The work described in this paper was supported in part by Shanghai Pujiang Program (18PJC025); in part by National Natural Science Foundation of China (71872064, 61603240, 71201059, 71772063, and 71431004); in part by Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai (18ZR1409400).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Pricing; manufacturing; game theory; optimization

摘要：This paper considers price and modularity of competition between two firms with deterministic demand, in which demand is dependent on both the prices and the modularity levels determined by two firms. Bertrand competition and Stackelberg competition are formulated to derive the equilibrium solutions analytically. Because of the complexity, an intensive numerical study is conducted to investigate the impact of the sensitive parameters on equilibrium prices and modularity levels, as well as optimal profits of the two firms. An important and interesting finding is that optimal profits of the two firms under both types of competition are decreasing with the modularity cost when the price and modularity sensitivities are low, where both firms are worse-off due to decrease of the modularity levels; but they are increasing when the price and modularity sensitivities are high, where both firms are better-off at the expense of modular design. Our research reveals that Stackelberg game improves the modularity levels in most of the cases, though both firms perform better in Bertrand competition in these cases when jointly deciding the prices and modularity levels in the two firms.