文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：投资者互动与高管减持:来自“雪球论坛”的实证证据

英文题名：Investor Interaction and Executive Share Reduction:Evidence from the Xueqiu Forum

作者：熊艳[1];白云[1];罗劲博[2]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237;[2]兰州大学管理学院,兰州730000

年份：2025

卷号：38

期号：5

起止页码：103

中文期刊名：管理科学

外文期刊名：Journal of Management Science

收录：;北大核心:【北大核心2023】；

基金：国家社会科学基金(22BGL076,23BGL095);教育部人文社会科学研究(21YJA630101);兰州大学“人工智能+”哲学社会科学专项课题(LZUAIYJZD05)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：投资者互动;高管减持;雪球论坛;线上治理;中小股东积极主义

外文关键词：investor interaction;managerial selling;Xueqiu Forum;online governance;activism of minority shareholders

摘要：内部人股票减持易扰乱资本市场稳定却又难于治理,是长期以来阻碍金融市场高质量发展的重要监管难题。已有研究多基于公司治理和政策制度角度考察内部人减持的制约因素,鲜有研究考虑中小股东这一治理角色,而中小股东恰恰是内部人减持的最终“受害者”,有足够强的动力抵制内部人减持,相应的治理意愿也极其强烈。近年来,随着中小股东线上治理力量崛起,投资者通过股票平台互动讨论形成的减持治理角色异军突起。以2013年至2017年“雪球论坛”减持讨论帖数据为研究对象,探究了投资者的减持讨论互动能否约束高管减持的机会主义行为,并从信息不对称、股价波动性和监管问询视角检验其中的影响机制。从产权性质、投资者保护程度、高管薪酬水平、股利支付和媒体报道等方面,探讨投资者互动对高管减持的异质性影响,并进一步分析了投资者互动引发的股票收益、股价同步性和公司价值等经济后果。研究结果表明,股票论坛中的投资者互动降低了上市公司高管减持股票的比例,这是通过降低信息不对称和股价波动性并引发监管问询实现的,该效应在民营所有权、投资者保护程度高、高管薪酬水平高、媒体报道少以及股利支付率低公司的情境下更强。投资者互动对股票减持行为的治理作用最终会带来中小投资者回报增加、股价同步性降低,以及未来公司价值提升等积极的经济后果。丰富了投资者互动的研究对象,从中小股东积极主义的视角拓展了内部人减持的制约因素研究,并从信息不对称的角度厘清了投资者互动影响高管减持的路径,为内部人减持的监督治理提供了有益的启示和借鉴。从政策上看,监管部门应加强对减持的信息披露监管和违规惩处,社交媒体平台应强化数智化治理职能,上市公司应加强自身监督治理职能建设,与社交媒体积极协同,共同发挥各自治理减持的功能。
Insider stock sell-offs can easily disrupt the stability of the capital market but are difficult to regulate,which has long been an important regulatory challenge hindering the high-quality development of the financial market.Existing research has mostly examined the constraints on insider sell-offs from the perspectives of corporate governance and policy systems,with few studies considering the role of minority shareholders in governance.However,minority shareholders are precisely the ultimate“victims”of insider sell-offs,possessing a strong motivation to resist it,and their governance intentions are extremely strong.In recent years,with the rise of online governance power of minority shareholders,investors have emerged as a new force in share reduction governance through interactive discussions on stock platforms.This study takes the discussion posts on stock sell-offs from the Xueqiu Forum from 2013 to 2017 as the research object,exploring whether the interaction of investor discussions can restrain the opportunistic behavior of executives share reduction,and examines the impact mechanism from the perspectives of information asymmetry,stock price volatility,and regulatory inquiries.The study discusses the heterogeneous impact of investor interaction on executive share reduction from aspects such as property rights nature,the level of investor protection,executive compensation,dividend payments,and media reports.And it further analyzes the economic consequences such as stock profit gains,stock price synchronicity,and company value triggered by investor interaction.The research results show that investor interaction in stock forums reduces the proportion of stocks sold by listed company executives.This is achieved by reducing information asymmetry and stock price volatility,and triggering regulatory inquiries.This effect is stronger in situations of private ownership,high levels of investor protection,high executive compensation,less media coverage,and low dividend payout ratios.The governance effect of investor interaction on share reduction behavior ultimately leads to increased returns for retail investors,reduced stock price synchronicity,and enhanced future company value.This study enriches the research subjects of investor interaction,expands the study of constraints on insider sell-offs from the perspective of activism among minority shareholders,and clarifies the path of investor interaction affecting executive share reduction from the perspective of information asymmetry,providing beneficial insights and references for the supervision and governance of insider sell-offs.From a policy perspective,regulatory authorities should strengthen the supervision of information disclosure and punishment for violations in sell-offs,social media platforms should enhance their digital governance functions,listed companies should strengthen their own governance functions,and actively cooperate with social media to jointly play their respective roles in governing sell-offs.