文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Coevolution of Supervision and Cooperation Under Environmental Feedback in Public Good Games

作者：Liang, Haili[1];Sun, Tao[1];Zhou, Zhao[2];Cao, Ming[3]

机构：[1]Shanghai Univ, Sch Mechatron Engn & Automat, Shanghai 200444, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Informat Sci & Engn, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[3]Univ Groningen, Fac Sci & Engn, ENTEG, NL-9747 AG Groningen, Netherlands

年份：2025

外文期刊名：IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS

收录：;EI(收录号：20254619512618);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001616575200001)】；

基金：This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 62373153, Grant 62394345, Grant 62336005, and Grant 61703261; and in part by the China Scholarship Council, and the Open Research Project of the State Key Laboratory of Industrial Control Technology of China under Grant ICT2024B67.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Games; Stability analysis; Thermal stability; Bifurcation; Costs; Game theory; Biological system modeling; Mathematical models; Limit-cycles; Buildings; Cooperation; environmental feedback; evolutionary games; public good games; supervision mechanisms

摘要：Understanding the emergence and stability of co-operation in resource-sharing systems is fundamental to evolutionary game theory and sustainability science. Existing studies of public goods games have largely overlooked the bidirectional coupling between strategic behavior and environmental dynamics. To bridge this gap, we propose a coevolutionary framework for threshold-based public goods games that integrates environmental feedback and supervisory punishment mechanisms. In our model, the strategies of the agents evolve in conjunction with the ecological states, while supervisory incentives regulate individual behavior. Using replicator dynamics and bifurcation analysis, we identify critical conditions for the stability of internal equilibria and demonstrate how cooperation thresholds and supervisory incentives act as bifurcation parameters. Our results reveal the occurrence of Hopf and heteroclinic bifurcations, highlighting complex dynamical patterns such as oscillatory cooperation. Simulations confirm the theoretical predictions, showing that cooperation and regulatory incentives coevolve adaptively under changing ecological constraints. This work advances the understanding of feedback-driven cooperation and provides novel insights into designing adaptive governance mechanisms in complex socioecological systems.